David Boonin-Vail. In her article, “A Defense of Abortion,” Judith Jarvis Thomson defended the following thesis: the impermissibility of abortion does. David Boonin has written the most thorough and detailed case for the moral permissibility of abortion yet published. Critically examining a wide range of. Boonin, David, A Defense of Abortion, Cambridge University Press, , pp, $ (pbk), ISBN Reviewed by: Win-chiat Lee.

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Fetal pain perception and pain refense. But this also makes Boonin’s defense of abortion only as good as those premises that the critics can or do already accept. It’s most impressive for its goal of defending abortion using arguments that pro-life folks already accept. More generally, the problem can be formulated in the following way: Similarly, Thompson thinks that a woman davic the right to abort a fetus even though one assumes, for the sake of argument, that it would lead to the death of another person since the aim would be to avoid the burden of pregnancy rather than to kill the fetus.

As discussed above, adoption provides an alternative to infanticide, and as long as parenthood can be avoided by means other than killing the fetus, such an option seems preferable to infanticide. David Boonin University of Colorado, Boulder. Such a position would still not rule out the moral permissibility of infanticide according to criteria based on the existence of consciousness. One might try to defend criteria based on the existence of consciousness while still holding that infanticide is wrong by arguing that one cannot know for sure that the fetus lacks consciousness before birth.

Contents Framing the Debate. Third, it seems difficult to identify ov criteria—i. A Study in Moral and Legal Philosophy. Explore the Home Gift Guide. Like the person who does not violate the violinist’s right to life by disconnecting herself from the violinist, a mother who aborts a fetus also does not violate the fetus’s right to life. Customers who bought this item also bought.


Obligations to persons and other living things. Jul 04, Joshua Stein rated it liked it Shelves: Jennifer is currently reading it Apr 15, Nicole marked it as to-read Jan 21, Support Center Support Center. Now, one can certainly question the legitimacy of choosing to kill the infant rather than to give it up for adoption—and I will do that later on—but that is not at issue here.

Scott rated it really liked it Apr aboetion, Huffman – – Dissertation, University of Missouri – Columbia. Just a moment while we sign you in to your Goodreads account. There have been a few attempts to defend this criterion, but as many commentators have noted, implausible implications seem inevitably to undermine it.

Here is how or scientists put it, when commenting on the emergence of fetal consciousness: Abortion criteria based on consciousness or viability cannot consequently rule out the permissibility of infanticide.

They had better look elsewhere for the source of the special obligation of the mother and perhaps even the father towards the fetus in non-rape cases to make sefense case for obonin moral impermissibility of abortion in such cases.

A systematic literature review. Boonin thinks we cannot attribute any desire in any sense to a being unless it has some actual desires.

A Defense of Abortion – David Boonin – Google Books

The second kind focuses on the difference between the nature of the act of disconnecting from the violinist and the nature of the act of aborting the fetus letting die vs. Consequently, not only is consciousness at this fetal stage empirically uncertain, it is also uncertain what ethical relevance such consciousness should then be ascribed see [ 1718 ].

To ask other readers questions about A Defense of Abortionplease sign up. Selective Abortion in Brazil: The book is a little dense and took me a while to get through.


Whatever other properties you and I actually share with the fetus either cannot explain why you and I have the right to life or cannot rule out sperms and eggs as also having the right to life. One would think that it makes a difference to the mother’s obligation towards the fetus whether she has engaged in the sexual intercourse voluntarily without the use of contraception while foreseeing the possibility or even the likelihood of getting pregnant in doing so.


Buy the selected items together This item: A Natural Response to Boonin.

Why should the baby live? Consequently, neither viability criterion nor the other consciousness-based criteria can simultaneously justify both the permissibility of abortion and the impermissibility of infanticide.

Proponents of the GS argument claim that abortion is permissible even if the fetus is assumed to be a person. The Ethics of Abortion: Not surprisingly, many objections to the good Samaritan argument are devoted to identifying some moral disanalogy between the case of the violinist and abortion.

The book is designed to be a strong overview of the subject of abortion for those with a little bit of general ethics training, and on this point I think it succeeds. Aidinowsky rated it it was amazing Jul 14, And indeed, as I show below, proponents of the GS argument need to adhere to this view—according to which the moral status of an action is affected by the intention—in order for their argument to work.

In a nutshell, this is the pro-choice argument which acknowledges that embryos and fetuses are human persons, entitled to the same rights that already-born persons enjoy, but claims that pregnant women are entitled to have abortions anyway, because the woman’s right to control the contents of her body and her bodily life-support functions overtrumps her fetus’ right to life, just as the right to control the contents of your body overtrumps the right to life of any already-born patient who may need a life-sustaining transfusion or transplant from you.

Her situation is therefore different from that of a person who, through a voluntary act, creates a dependency of another existing person on her.